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Introduction 
 
The TRIPS Agreement, by ensuring stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes around the 
world, has globalized the IP system and stimulated greater cross-border trade in knowledge 
assets. Technology transfer, a term still not defined in the WTO framework, has come to be seen 
as the primary strategy for developing countries to gain access to much needed, but legally 
protected, knowledge assets owned in developed economies. It is not particularly surprising that 
the IMF’s Balance of Payment statistics show that most developing countries pay much more in 
licensing and royalty fees to third parties than they receive. The transfer of technology from the 
developed to the developing world through licensing arrangements is an important process that 
merits discussion. The role of technology transfer in development has received considerable 
attention (Teece 1977; Liu 1995; Bozeman 2000; Hewitt-Dundas 2011; Saggi 2002; Schrank 
2004). However, while technology transfer remains a major issue in global economic governance 
debates, it is equally important to recognize the alternative IP commercialization techniques 
available to actors in both the developed and developing world. By recognizing these alternatives, 
developing nations may eventually begin to close the gap that prevails in IP commercialization 
globally.  
 
As IP ownership grows, it is increasingly significant to identify the various mechanisms available 
to rights holders in developing countries to commercialize their intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). This study reviews several IP monetization strategies in order to emphasize the ways that 
IP can be used to generate domestic innovation and growth within developing nations. 
Essentially, we are asking: what methods enable developing country innovators to commercialize 
their technology within their own nation and abroad? In doing so, we explore the variety of IP 
monetization techniques that exist and assess the extent to which they promote active markets for 
technology in developing countries. IP defines a wide spectrum of rights including copyright, 
trademarks, design rights, patents and geographical indicators. Our analysis remains focused on 
patent monetization strategies. This is to retain analytical clarity and also because patents 
generate the most economic value globally. However, it is also important to recognize that these 
other forms of IP can be proactively developed and monetized through mechanisms such as 
securitization, licensing, and secondary markets.  
 
This report outlines the different commercial tools available to innovators in the developing 
world in order to monetize patents and foster the diffusion of technology, thus attracting 
opportunities for joint ventures and other forms of international technological collaboration. This 
method contrasts with more common approaches that investigate how developing countries can 
attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Multinational Corporations (MNCs) through the 
enforcement mechanisms of a strong IP regime.  Since academic research typically evaluates 
IPRs from an enforcement perspective, the role of IPRs in developing countries is primarily 
conceived through the prism of the influence of ‘weak’ vs. ‘strong’ IP regimes (Gould and 
Gruben 1996; James 2001; Lanjouw and Lerner 1997). While the rule of law is certainly a 
constitutive element of functioning markets, this research does not assess which policy reforms 
are needed to guarantee ownership over IPRs in developing countries. This question has already 
been extensively discussed in academic and policy circles (Maskus and Reichman 2004; Helfer 
2004; Hassan et al. 2010). Instead, the focus of this paper remains on the mechanisms that 
promote uptake of patent monetization techniques. Accordingly, patent owners in developing 
countries are not conceptualized as passive receivers of proprietary innovation developed 
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elsewhere, but rather as active participants in an increasingly global economic system that could 
be driven just as much by emerging markets as established ones. While we recognize the 
institutional constraints that patent owners may face, and the fact that developing countries are 
lagging behind the developed world in fostering genuinely domestic innovation, we argue that 
there are ample opportunities for patent owners in developing markets to leverage their IP to 
promote economic growth. We suggest that the IP ownership divide may be closing, but that 
substantial differences persist in the extent of IP commercialization in various countries. 
Emerging markets that are becoming global leaders in IP ownership seem to lag behind in 
relation to the financial returns they are able to generate from their innovations. While bilateral 
licensing remains a valuable mechanism to extract value from IP, we posit that developing 
countries can capitalize on both market- and policy-driven IP monetization mechanisms in order 
to promote active technology markets. These include patent securitization, patent exchange 
platforms, public-private technology transfer initiatives, and public support in patent litigation 
procedures. A combination of institutional support and the adoption of alternative 
commercialization processes should help developing nations promote stronger technology 
markets and generate more financial returns from IP in the future.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, IMF licensing statistics are reviewed for a small sample 
of countries in order to increase understanding of the degree of IP commercialization 
internationally. Then, statistical evidence from the WIPO database on global patent stocks is used 
to demonstrate the growing ownership of IP in developing nations. The WIPO data suggests that 
the IP divide, defined as the gap in IP ownership between developed and developing countries, is 
gradually narrowing for the more technologically sophisticated developing countries. However, a 
significant divide persists in terms of IP commercialization. While this may be driven by 
differences in patent quality around the globe, we focus here on the relevance of IP monetization 
options in addressing this divide. The second section briefly outlines the key concepts of patent 
monetization and presents multiple case studies in order to identify some of the instruments 
available to commercialize IP assets. It explores the role of patent securitization, online patent 
exchanges, technology transfer offices and joint public-private funding, and finally the impact of 
public litigation support for small innovating firms. 
 
The Intellectual Property Commercialization Divide 
The Global Distribution of Licensing Revenue 
 
In order to get a more detailed picture of the global licensing landscape, a set of 22 countries was 
selected for analysis. The selection process sought to ensure that a variety of income levels and 
geographic locations were represented in the study. This was done to provide a more 
differentiated understanding of the global licensing landscape. Accordingly, we included a range 
of high-income, middle-income and low-income countries in our study. The selection also sought 
to emphasize large emerging economies that represent significant international markets. Those 
selected among the high-income countries with a GNP per capita above $25,000 were the USA, 
Germany, Japan, France and Italy. The middle-income countries selected, with a GNP per capita 
of $5000 - $25,000, were Botswana, Brazil, South Korea, Poland, the Russian Federation and 
South Africa. From low-income countries with a GNP per capita below $5,000, we selected 
Bolivia, China, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco and the Philippines. In making this selection 
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we also sought to represent a diverse range of geographies in order to avoid focusing on a single 
region. While data on licenses and royalties received was available for all countries, it was not 
possible to get comprehensive data relating to all stocks of patents and trademarks in all of the 
selected countries. Despite this limitation, our findings suggest that global licensing revenues 
continue to grow. However, revenues remain unequally distributed across nations. Interestingly, 
the gap in licensing revenues is stronger than the gap in patent ownership. Though the growth in 
licensing revenues can be seen as an indicator of the greater efficiency of technology utilization, 
we still observe strong differences in the global distribution of licensing revenue.  
 
In table 1 below (ranked according to license fees received), high-income countries are marked in 
violet, middle-income countries are marked in red and low-income countries are marked in black. 
The IMF data used in this classification is not ideal because it reflects licensing and royalty 
revenues received from a range of forms of intellectual property and intellectual capital (IC), such 
as patents, trademarks, business franchises and copyright. Balance of payment data for license 
fees can be misleading because it captures many intra-firm transactions that are not specifically 
tied to knowledge creation and patent monetization. For example, a country may have a high 
level of receipts because of a favourable tax environment or because of the prevalence of profit-
shifting techniques such as transfer pricing. This is an important limitation to the conclusions that 
can be drawn from this data. However, it is the best data currently available worldwide and it still 
offers valuable insights on capital flows associated with various forms of IP and IC. While 
certainly not sufficient to establish a causal relationship between patent ownership and licensing 
revenue, it provides a useful illustration of the IP commercialization divide. It is an interesting 
fact in itself that the only data available on monetary streams associated with IP does not offer 
clearly disaggregated indicators. This may reflect a lack of awareness regarding the need to grasp 
the value of IP in terms of its commercial relevance. The majority of existing innovation indexes 
continue to measure innovation output primarily in terms of patents held rather than according to 
the economic value of those patents. This is unfortunate because it suggests to policy makers in 
the developing world that stimulating higher levels of patent filings is sufficient to foster 
domestic innovation. Patent quality, discussed later, is an equally significant concern. 
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Table 1. Royalty, license fees received and paid and balance of payments 2009 
 
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files) 
 
The table indicates significant differences in the total economic value of royalties received and 
paid. Whereas high-income nations pay and receive royalties in the range of trillions of $US, 
low-income countries perform extremely poorly in comparison. The data suggests that low-
income countries may remain marginalized in the international IP system, despite being 
increasingly integrated into the legal and economic framework that supports it. To argue that IP 
has negative side effects for developing countries in general does not appreciate that they may, in 
fact, suffer from a lack of exposure to and experience with this relatively new international 
system of proprietary innovation. While developing countries do currently suffer from lower 
technological capability and less valuable IP, greater experience with alternative IP monetization 
mechanisms could be a step towards addressing the current gap in licensing revenues. 
 
With the exception of the USA, Japan and France, all countries in our sample dispose of a 
negative balance of licensing payments. This makes the majority of the surveyed countries net 
importers of IP. This is not necessarily a bad thing. If, for example, the imported IP helps 
domestic actors leverage foreign innovation as an engine of economic growth, then it can be 
positive. This will depend on the locus of analysis, since different conclusions are possible if one 
focuses, for example, on social welfare or economic output metrics. However, if the country 
owns large patent portfolios itself but pays more in licensing than it receives, then it is likely, 
subject to the underlying quality of the IP portfolio, that they are not adequately commercializing 
their IP. These two possibilities are not mutually exclusive. A nation may effectively leverage 
imported IP but remain ineffective at trading its own IP. The accumulation of patent portfolios 
for other strategic reasons such as a deterrent to litigation, a bargaining chip during negotiation, 
and as a signal for start-up financing will also impact these figures. 
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A Narrowing IP Ownership Divide 
 
IP encompasses several rights including copyright, trademarks, design rights, patents and 
geographical indicators. The IMF data relating to balance of payments unfortunately does not 
distinguish between them. Since the focus of the IP monetization section below is on patents, it is 
important to explore the existing gaps between patent ownership and commercialization. Data on 
global patenting trends is also far more comprehensive than other forms of IP, making it a more 
reliable indicator on which to base the analysis.  
 
Figure 1. Patent Grants: Top 10 Countries of Origin, 2008 
 
Patent grants: top ten countries 
of origin, 2008
Source: World Intellectual Property Organization
239,388
146,871
79,652
53,752 48,814
25,535 22,870 12,789 12,162 11,291
 
(Source: World Intellectual Property Organization) 
 
Data on patent grants by country of origin is frequently used as a measure of innovation output.  
This is because it is cost-effective, publically available time-series data that provides detailed 
information relating to the origin of inventors and applicants (Trajtenberg 1990). As shown in 
Figure 1, countries that perform well in terms of total patent grants do not necessarily perform 
well in terms of the total revenue generated from these rights. This is an important finding, since 
innovation is focused on commercializing patent assets, among other knowledge assets. What is 
most striking is that South Korea, China and Russia hold the third, fifth and seventh largest patent 
portfolios respectively. The USA, which drastically outperforms all other nations in terms of IP 
royalties Balance of Payments, only holds the second largest portfolio. This may be the result of 
strong publishing industries in film, music and books, but is also likely to be influenced by the 
variety of patent commercialization techniques evident in the USA. It is particularly interesting 
that China, Brazil and South Korea own some of the largest patent portfolios but dispose of 
negative Balance of Payments in terms of IP licensing and royalty revenues. While the quality of 
their patents is an important determining factor, it also suggests that they may be in a strong 
position to benefit from patent monetization mechanisms. 
 
Figure 2 suggests that innovation seems to be increasingly international in character. As R&D 
collaboration increases across national boundaries, the number of patent applications with at least 
one foreign inventor is steadily growing. Though this data does not indicate which country or 
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income group these inventors are from, it suggests a stronger focus on international R&D 
alliances and collaboration. This is a positive development since a higher level of collaboration 
should help stimulate technology transfer and knowledge spillovers. 
 
Figure 2. Patent Applications Filed Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) With at Least 
One Foreign Inventor, As a Percentage of Total PCT Filings, 1990 – 2009 
 
 
(Source: WIPO World Intellectual Property Report 2011) 
 
Global data from the WIPO database summarized in Figure 3 suggests the gap between domestic 
and foreign patent applications is closing in middle-income countries. Compared to 57% of 
patent applications filed by residents in high-income countries, the middle-income group exhibits 
a 52% resident filing rate. In contrast, low-income countries continue to experience a significant 
disparity, where residents file only 20% of patent applications.  
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Figure 3. Patent Application Share by Income Group, 2008 
 
 
(Source: WIPO Statistics Database June 2010) 
 
In terms of our sample, it is interesting that in Russia, Poland, South Korea and China patent 
applications are to a large extent filed by residents. Roughly 75% of patent applications in Poland 
and South Korea are filed by residents. China has nearly the same distribution of resident to non-
resident applications as the USA, with almost 60% of applications filed by residents.  
 
China is an informative case for developing nations. Though patent law has only existed since 
1985, the Chinese government has promoted an ‘ecosystem of incentives’ for individuals to file 
patents in order to stimulate domestic innovation.
1
 Workers and students who file patents earn 
residence permits to live in attractive areas, while professors increase their chances of winning 
tenure. Cash bonuses are offered in some cases, the government covers filing costs in others. 
Corporate income tax can be cut over 10% for companies filing multiple patents. This public 
sector drive has consequences in the private sector as well: the potential for tax reductions and 
government contracts pushes firms to offer employees incentives to patent. Huawei pays 
employees patent-related bonuses of $1,500 to $15,000, partially contributing to its meteoric rise 
to the top firm for international patent filings. China’s total patent filings grew 26% from 2003 to 
2009, dwarfing growth in all other regions: 6% in the USA, 5% in South Korea, 4% in Europe 
and 1% in Japan.
2
 Yet, China remains far behind all of these countries in terms of licensing 
revenue. This may be due to a time-lag between patent ownership and monetization. However, it 
is more likely the result of policies that incentivize the filing of patents without adequately 
emphasizing the importance of patent quality for generating licensing income. These incentive 
systems precipitated a rush in patent filing, often for inventions of little or no value. The rapid 
rise in utility-model patents, which do not require inventions to be ‘novel’ and last only 10 years, 
is a problem in terms of patent monetization. A Thomson Reuters survey in China shows that 
only one fifth of patent professionals believe Chinese patents are of high quality, a smaller 
                                                 
1
 http://www.economist.com/node/17257940 
2
 http://www.economist.com/node/17257940 
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proportion than any other region in the world included in the survey.
3
 Developing nations must 
balance incentives to file patents with threshold standards for patent quality in order to truly 
capitalize on IP as a value generator. 
 
Overall, the degree of IP ownership in middle-income and high-income countries is gradually 
equalizing. Low-income countries remain behind but they are catching up. Though the gap in 
patent ownership is starting to close for technologically sophisticated developing countries, the 
gap in commercialization remains significant. 
 
A Growing IP Commercialization Divide 
 
An important consideration affecting patent commercialization potential is that of patent quality. 
China’s ecosystem of incentives has drastically increased the total number of patents filed by 
residents. Yet, this growth has not resulted in a proportional rise in licensing revenue. The 
commercial value of a patent depends on its quality, which is roughly synonymous with patent 
validity in terms of its claims (Noveck 2006), but also includes measures such as forward 
citations, extent of patent family, and applicable territories. The USA and other developed 
economies have had significant difficulties with patent quality, which result in litigation costs 
exceeding returns from patents and inhibit the development of upstream innovations. As 
emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil strengthen their IP systems, they have 
adopted more stringent standards towards qualification criteria such as novelty and disclosures of 
origin (Reichman 2009). In this manner, they hope to avoid the issues that have arisen in 
developed economies. This example suggests that, in implementing IP regimes, developing 
countries should look to the experience of developed economies in order to streamline the 
process and achieve the desired results.  
 
It is not always the size of the patent portfolio that matters. For example, China ranks fourth 
worldwide in terms of patents for green technologies according to a recent analysis of patent 
applications filed in 76 countries between 2000 and 2005 but it falls to tenth rank when the 
analysis is restricted to patents filed internationally (i.e. claimed priorities in more than the home 
country). Brazil also ranks eleventh and then plummets to thirty-first according to the same 
criteria (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2011). Some patents are also simply less valuable than others in 
terms of their commercial potential. The fact that Kenya and Botswana pay more in royalties than 
they receive could suggest both countries simply own IP of lower commercial value or 
technological relevance. This raises important questions as to why the patent application was 
filed in the first place. Again, the critical issue of patent quality arises. However, assuming 
adequate patent quality, the situation suggests the necessary skills and infrastructure to monetize 
IP internationally do not exist in Botswana or Kenya. 
 
The IMF data provides a rough picture of global monetary flows associated with IP but it is 
inadequate to make concrete statements regarding the state of each national IP system in detail. 
Yet, the figures do suggest that the majority of nations struggle with IP commercialization. The 
difference in the historical performance of the high-, middle- and low-income countries in terms 
                                                 
3
 http://www.economist.com/node/17257940 
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of licensing Balance of Payments demonstrates this and suggests there is a growing IP 
commercialization divide.  
 
Figure 4. High-income States: Licensing and Royalties Balance of Payments, 1980-2009 
 
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files) 
 
Figure 4 shows that high-income countries all exhibit slow growth or a static Balance of 
Payments – hovering between + $5 billion and - $5 billion - between 1980 and 2007 (the most 
recent available year). The USA is the obvious exception in this group. With a phenomenal 
increase in its Balance of Payments from + $5 billion to + $65 billion, it is the clear historical 
winner.  
 
The passing of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, which enabled US universities, SMEs and non-profit 
organizations to appropriate control of IP resulting from federally funded research, is often 
regarded as an important factor in the increase of patenting and licensing activity by these actors. 
This has led many other OECD and developing nations to consider enacting similar policy 
measures to stimulate licensing revenue. Clarifying IP ownership in public-private partnerships is 
a useful policy measure to reduce operating uncertainty and stimulate the commercialization of 
IP. However, critics remark that it is difficult to disaggregate the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act 
from other factors that influenced the growth of licensing revenue in US universities post-1980 
(David C. Mowery and Ziedonis 2002; D.C. Mowery et al. 1999; Henderson, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg 1998). The highly interactive relationship between US research universities and 
industrial research groups that existed prior to the Act as well as the structure of US universities, 
‘which blended financial autonomy, public funding from state and local sources with federal 
research support’ on a large scale, resulted in research that focused on solving agricultural and 
industrial problems rather than pursuing purely scientific principles (Mowery and Sampat 2005). 
Given the difference in educational systems throughout the world, the implementation of similar 
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policies to stimulate the commercialization of public research should be approached with caution. 
Other scholarship has highlighted technology field differences, recognizing that licensing is not 
effective to the same degree in all fields and arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act did in fact lead to 
shifts in university patenting towards fields where licensing is an effective mechanism to transfer 
knowledge and generate licensing revenue (Scott 2004). Academic study on the impact of the 
Bayh-Dole Act suggests that technology field differences, the research focus and institutional 
structures of universities, and the extent of collaboration between public and private actors all 
influence the extent to which universities can monetize patent assets via licensing. Policy makers 
in the developing world must appreciate these subtleties when considering similar approaches.  
 
Figure 5. Middle-income States: Licensing and Royalties Balance of Payments, 1980-2009 
 
 
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files) 
 
Figures 5 and 6 show that Balance of Payments for IP royalties in middle-income nations have 
moderately decreased over time and low-income countries have experienced more rapid decline. 
1995 marks a clear turning point for most countries in the sample. While the high-income 
countries began experiencing a positive increase in Balance of Payments, middle- and low-
income countries moved from a static neutral position to an increasingly negative one. 
 
Middle-income states: licensing & royalties 
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Figure 6. Low-income States: Licensing and Royalties Balance of Payments, 1980-2009 
 
 
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files) 
 
Data from our sample suggests that important gaps in IP commercialization persist. This is the 
case both in terms of the volume of licensing and royalty revenues and the direction of cash flows 
associated with innovation. Developing countries seem to be significantly marginalized in this 
aspect of the international system. Analysis of the entire World Bank dataset for all countries and 
income categories in 2009 (including those outside our sample) confirms this hypothesis (Table 
3).  
 
Table 3. Licensing and Royalties Balance of Payments, 2009 
Licensing & royalties balanc  of payments, 2009
Includes entire World Bank dataset, not just case study states; also uses different 
definitions of income categories
Country Group
Royalty, License 
Fees Received
Royalty, License 
Fees Paid
IP Balance of 
Payments
Payments as a 
% of Receipts
High income $177,835,372,041 $156,372,095,047 $21,463,276,994 88%
Middle income $3,766,598,542 $32,421,925,901 -$28,655,327,359 861%
Low income $33,678,498 $67,097,779 -$33,419,281 199%
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files
 
(Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook and data files) 
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The Monetization of Intellectual Property 
Intellectual Property Enables Technology Commercialization  
 
The institutionalization of property rights is a constitutive element of a market economy. 
Intellectual property is typically conceived as a means of reducing market failures associated with 
knowledge assets that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in consumption (Merges 1994). The 
introduction of property rights over intangibles renders embedded and tacit knowledge codifiable, 
functional and manageable. In general, the introduction of property rights enables the generation 
of surplus value. People can still extract ‘use value’ from land, such as collecting fruits and game, 
without property rights. However, the introduction of property rights over land enables additional 
revenue streams not necessarily related to its primary use value, such as rent and sale. In a similar 
manner, the introduction of IPRs enables people to not only extract value from its primary use, 
but also through a variety of secondary monetization mechanisms. A major benefit of the IP 
system is that it institutionalizes a framework that permits people to extract value from the 
exchange of knowledge, which may be decoupled from its primary use value.  
 
The conventional economic rationale for IP is linked with the hedging of risk associated with 
research and development. While this is certainly true, we are more interested in elaborating on 
the various mechanisms available to monetize IP. Like scholars such as Knight (1942) and 
Schumpeter (1942), we argue that IP bears the potential to foster entrepreneurship as the 
introduction of property rights is a constitutive element of prospering markets. IP institutionalizes 
a commercial paradigm over knowledge relations and can thus be seen as a cornerstone of the 
knowledge based economy. To discuss to what extent it is legitimate to commercialize 
knowledge relations and where the boundaries of knowledge privatization should be set is not the 
subject of the paper. This said, the privatization of knowledge relations is an important political 
issue that should not go unnoticed. Defining knowledge as a tradable good, which can be stored 
and exchanged, liberates it from a system where knowledge is only as valuable as the ability of 
the owner to use it. By disaggregating knowledge and invention from its owner, IP is legally 
packaged for the transfer of ownership through a transaction (May 2002). 
 
IP is the currency of the knowledge-based economy. Without a functioning IP system, knowledge 
- like labour - cannot be alienated, and its value is limited to the ability or inclination of the 
innovator to put it to work. Such a system disadvantages innovators by inhibiting their ability to 
monetize their ideas, which they can do under an IP system even if they lack the time, skills or 
resources to commercialize it themselves. The IP system places knowledge and ideas in a market 
system, acting simultaneously as a legal framework that facilitates disputes over ownership and 
infringement, thus lowering the cost of IP enforcement for individual firms. From a social 
perspective, the absence of a functioning IP system that can be observed in many developing 
countries annihilates immeasurable values of knowledge and ideas by providing no system 
through which to realize their tradable worth (May 2002). 
 
The perspective adopted here of IP as an enabling mechanism for developing nations rather than 
a defensive right for the prosperous turns traditional understandings of IP on their head. 
However, both within academia and business there is an emerging trend of recognizing the value 
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proposition of IP through an intangible assets perspective (Chesbrough 2006; Arora, Fosfuri, and 
Gambardella 2001; Merges 1999; Feldman and Florida 1994). IP is seen as a powerful emerging 
asset class that can be proactively managed, developed, and nurtured to enhance business value 
(Malackowski 2006; Reilly and Schweihs 2004). 
 
Conceptualizing IP as enabling is particularly important for developing countries often 
considered victims of international IP harmonization (Bettig 1996; May 2009). IP can be an 
instrument that empowers IP owners in developing countries because it increases the economic 
advantages derived from property rights and precipitates a governance structure owned and 
operated by innovators. Yet it is important to move beyond simple conceptions of IP ownership 
and protection and towards a deeper understanding of how patents can be effectively monetized. 
The data surveyed above shows how the international divide in patent ownership is gradually 
narrowing but that the commercialization divide is still significant. In order to demonstrate the 
variety of strategies available to patent owners in developing countries to monetize their IP, we 
now turn to case studies of patent monetization techniques. The cases include patent 
securitizations, patent exchanges, technology transfer and commercialization infrastructure as 
well as infringement litigation support. Monetization mechanisms were selected on the basis of 
emphasizing the diversity of options available to innovators in the developing world. The 
different strategies available to extract greater value from patent assets range from purely market-
driven initiatives to public-private partnerships. While patent commercialization strategies 
necessarily involve private actors, the extent to which they rely on public policy support differs. 
Significantly, policy makers can help stimulate purely market-driven approaches by identifying 
relevant stakeholders and increasing awareness of the range of tools at their disposal. However, it 
is important to note that these market-driven monetization strategies rely on more sophisticated 
secondary technology markets that take time to develop. The obstacles encountered in this 
process – including concerns about liquidity, transparency and standardization - are an important 
topic of academic debate and are elaborated on by Hagelin 2002, McClure 2008, Millien and 
Laurie 2007, and Ziedonis 2004. This range of options to monetize patents from market to public-
private arrangements informs our analytical framework. The patent monetization cases discussed 
below begin at the private end of the spectrum and proceed onto those initiatives that require a 
greater amount of policy support. 
 
Patent Securitization 
 
Securitization has emerged as a major financial innovation in the past thirty years (Merges 1999) 
and the securitization of IP assets has received considerable attention from financial service firms 
(Malackowski 2006). In the simplest terms, IP securitization enables a company to pool certain 
rights and sell the future cash-flows associated with them for an immediate lump sum. There are 
numerous difficulties associated with IP securitization, such as valuation, royalty forecasting, and 
a lack of secondary markets for IP that are elaborated by Dorris 2003, Calderini and Odasso 
2008, Gabala Jr 2004, and Hillery 2004. The most valuable result of IP securitization is the 
unlocking of liquidity without committing the company’s credit, non-IP assets or issuing dilutive 
stock (Borod 2005). Innovating firms in the developing world often face significant challenges in 
raising capital to commercialize their innovations due to international investor uncertainty in 
developing markets. IP securitization presents a valuable opportunity for firms in developing 
economies to monetize their assets and improve capital liquidity because it distinguishes between 
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the firm itself and the IP assets in question. When securitized, IP portfolios are decoupled from 
the IP owning firm, which enables cash to be raised on the basis of the IP itself, rather than the 
underlying company. This enables investors to hedge risks associated with investment in 
innovation while permitting IP owners to access the capital necessary to commercialize their 
inventions. Innovating firms in the developing world with fewer tangible assets to back debt 
financing can now rely on their intangibles to raise much needed funding. Securitization 
effectively permits firms that may not be of a high investment grade to access capital through the 
international market; securitization repositions financial risk into a set of financial instruments 
such as Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) or Bankruptcy Remote Entities (BRE) (Anson 2005). By 
legally isolating the assets that are generating cash flows, investment credit ratings can be 
massively improved. 
 
While IPR securitization is historically more common with trademarks and copyrights, with 
patent securitization representing around 13% of total deals and only 9% of volume exchanged 
between 1997 and 2004 (Kirsh 2005), our focus here remains on patent securitization. Patent 
securitization has been almost exclusively associated with pharmaceutical patents since the 
royalty streams are typically more stable than other technologies. However, as secondary IP 
markets mature and valuation processes become more transparent and standardized, it is highly 
likely that securitization will diffuse to other technology sectors. The first case of patent 
securitization, established by Royalty Pharma AG in 2000, has received enormous amounts of 
academic attention. Founded on royalty payments for Yale University’s Zerit HIV drug patent 
that were licensed to Bristol Myers Squibb through a BRE, $115 million was issued in debt and 
equity securities in three tranches (Calderini and Odasso 2008). Despite its early amortization, 
this deal stands as an important landmark in patent securitization. Three years later in 2003 
another landmark case occurred when Royalty Pharma struck a securitization deal based on a 
pool of thirteen drug patents, including four drugs still waiting on FDA approval (Hillery 2004). 
Receiving a AAA rating from both Moody and Standard & Poor, $225 million in variable 
funding was raised. By pooling the patents, uncertainty regarding poor royalty performance was 
mitigated by a diversified portfolio. The issuance of a single tranche along with a robust 
insurance system also enabled this more successful securitization to raise patent-backed equity 
(Calderini and Odasso 2008). 
 
IP securitization can raise liquidity without relying on company finance reports, incurring income 
tax on proceeds, creating new debt on balance sheets and, usually, without losing the right to 
manage and exploit the IP in the future (Borod 2005; Watanabe 2004). Securitization can 
simultaneously lower the cost of capital, limit credit exposure and parcel risk across various 
patents. Pooled patent securitizations also enable innovators in the developing world to gain 
access to much needed finance by aggregating a large variety of patent rights into a single 
portfolio, and thus reducing the investor risk associated with a single patent. Patent securitization 
to date has remained highly geographically concentrated in the USA, most likely due to the 
maturity of its financial market (Calderini and Odasso 2008). Yet, there is tremendous potential 
for developing countries because firms in emerging economies can export their IP to developed 
markets to be securitized according to predictable and functioning market instruments, rather than 
try to import a range of required investment rules and institutions. While domestic capacity 
building is essential, securitization increases access to capital immediately and experience with 
structuring these deals should improve capabilities. Up-front payment in the early stages of 
technology development can be more useful to a company than future revenue streams or delayed 
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sale revenues. Patent securitization basically gives IPR owners access to better funding 
conditions than corporate alternatives in terms of both duration and flexibility of funding 
contracts (Kirsh 2005). 
 
Patent Exchanges 
 
The incredible growth in the value of IP assets globally has not been adequately matched with 
increased levels of funding for R&D in the developing world. Developing countries encounter 
two challenges: they must manage risks associated with innovation and they are largely unable to 
tap the full range of institutional investors because of their relatively undeveloped capital 
markets. Firms around the globe are missing out on valuable capital resources as a result of the 
inability to properly value and exchange their IPRs. Patents remain a highly illiquid asset and 
there is substantial difficulty in exploiting IPRs to generate greater cash flow. The development 
of a liquid and robust exchange for IPRs is a vital step to ensure that firms gain alternative forms 
of finance for innovation (Ughetto and Odasso 2010). Financial exchanges for patents enable 
non- or under-utilized patents to be traded in a transparent marketplace. An exchange is valuable 
because it makes patents available to those that are in the best position to monetize them. Firms 
in the developing world may own valuable product and service patents but have insufficient 
complementary assets to monetize them. The complementary assets of large multinational firms 
results in high barriers to entry for innovators in the developing world, who do not benefit from 
the same economies of scale and scope. An effective exchange mechanism for patents reduces the 
need for complementary assets to commercialize a product. Exchanges thus enable innovating 
firms to monetize their rights without the considerable capital outlays traditionally associated 
with this (Serrano 2006; Chesbrough 2006). Formal secondary markets for patents are believed to 
level the competitive playing field by lowering entry barriers and undermining privileged access 
to technology (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001). As such, they are a powerful tool for 
actors in the developing world to monetize their patent rights. 
 
Patent exchanges encounter a number of difficulties that the exchange of other commodities does 
not because of the nature of the rights being traded. Patent rights are by definition a claim to 
unique and novel technologies. The rights traded are thus extremely heterogeneous. Trading 
patents is not like trading sacks of rice or bars of gold. A lack of common valuation standards and 
a multitude of different types of rights complicate the process of turning patents into a 
standardized and tradable commodity. IP rights cannot be efficiently traded in a transparent 
market space until there are adequate standards for valuing them (Hagelin 2002). The valuation 
of intangible assets is an extensive subject of research and is elaborated on by Lanjouw et al, 
1998, Mard et al. 2000, Hagelin 2002, and Reilly and Schweihs 2004. Efficient patent exchanges 
rely on adequate information about the underlying rights traded and necessitate substantial due 
diligence in order to vet the traded assets. This process can result in significant information 
asymmetries that benefit larger actors during the bargaining process. The importance of some 
patent assets to firm performance also suggests that companies may only selectively exchange 
patents of minor value rather than engage in deals relating to their core business strategies. 
 
The Intellectual Property Exchange International (IPXI) is one intermediary that has attempted to 
establish such an exchange platform for patent rights. A subsidiary of Ocean Tomo LLC, IPXI 
implements a number of mechanisms to ensure that the problems associated with the exchange of 
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patents can be overcome. Creating a standardized Unit License Right (ULR) contract enables 
patent owners to license their technology in a non-discriminatory way to a variety of interested 
parties. The pricing mechanisms of ULR contracts are complex and described by Malackowski 
2010. The contracts provide potential buyers with a host of important purchasing information 
relating to the technology offered, the initial target price, and the quantity of contract units 
offered. Buyers of ULRs must report consumption behaviour to IPXI, which acts as the central 
monitoring and enforcement agency for the marketplace. The administrative responsibilities of 
IPXI, and the exchange platform facilitating the sale of patent rights commoditized through the 
ULR contract, reduce inefficiencies in bilateral technology transfer resulting from time, financial 
costs, redundancy problems and uncertainty of outcomes. ULRs may become an important 
liquidity alternative to normal equity and thus aid the monetization of patent rights. 
 
Firms in the developing world are in a strong position to use such an exchange platform to 
monetize their patent portfolios. The exchange permits them to interact with potential licensees 
that they may never have encountered within their own operating markets. This allows them to 
efficiently monetize their patents while the independent arbitration of the exchange by IPXI 
means firms benefit from reduced legal costs, avoid forced cross-licensing, outsourced 
marketing, auditing and enforcement capacities and regular audits on licensee behavior. 
Innovating firms in the developing world can rely on the expertise of IPXI and its affiliates and 
focus their energies on innovation. This distribution of labour improves patent monetization and 
expands the market for new technologies. While the success of IPXI’s exchange platform cannot 
be assessed yet because it is still in the process of being established, various exchange models are 
being introduced all over the world. The experience of other exchanges should serve as a learning 
experience for these initiatives. While online portals may be currently headquartered in 
developed economies, there is nothing stopping actors in the developing world from leveraging 
these digital platforms to their own benefit. The recent founding of the Shanghai Silicon IP 
Exchange (SSIPEX) in China and the TAEUS patent book project – albeit slightly different from 
IPXI - suggests that this model is gaining popularity and could be a valuable means for patent 
owners to monetize their rights through a secondary market.  
 
SSIPEX offers a range of IP consulting services and analytics software but its main offering is to 
act as a center for the transfer of IP related to semiconductors. It serves as a distribution channel 
for semiconductor technology owners and a demonstration center for local firms in order to help 
them assess which, if any, technology is suitable for their next product (Chesbrough 2011). It 
works with owners of semiconductor technologies in order to aggregate databases of 
manufacturing design tools, reference designs and other information. Foreign companies own 
70% of the IP made available through SSIPEX and domestic firms own the remaining 30% 
(Chesbrough 2011). Chinese companies are invited to assess the technology and SSIPEX brokers 
a license agreement if the Chinese firm wishes to integrate the technologies into new products. 
Crucially, SSIPEX is open to all members and does not discriminate according to which foundry 
is eventually used in the manufacturing process. Revenue comes from membership fees charged 
for access to the IP databases, fees charged for displaying IP on the exchange, and fees for 
transaction brokerage between members and IP owners. A laboratory was established in 2006 
inside SSIPEX to manufacture prototypes based on design brought by members. Functioning as a 
type of innovation black box, it prevents members from seeing exactly how the output was 
manufactured and it prevents them from reverse-engineering it. This enables prospective buyers 
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to get more information relating to the IP while still protecting owners’ rights (Chesbrough 
2011). 
 
SSIPEX is a very interesting experiment that aims to facilitate technology transfer and 
commercialization in China. It may be a valuable means of communicating to Chinese 
entrepreneurs that monetizing external IP can be more efficient than developing their own 
technologies in isolation. Yet, the attempt to establish the center has encountered many 
challenges. It is difficult to judge their exact origins but these challenges may stem from 
inadequate data protection and insufficient participation. With only 2752 patents focusing on 
integrated circuit technologies from 87 vendors and manufacturers in its core database
4
, the 
SSIPEX has not achieved the critical mass needed to make an exchange platform particularly 
efficient. While it is certainly an important center for technology transfer, its IP database may not 
be sufficiently developed to stimulate participation. There is a typical chicken/egg problem in this 
aspect of any exchange. An efficient market will stimulate participation, but an efficient market 
relies on adequate levels of participation. Another important challenge is the need for anonymity. 
The publication of patent details and the desire to exchange them can be used as competitive 
intelligence in many industries. Anonymity is required to maintain competitive strategies and 
avoid risks of litigation (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella 2001). Companies may be seeking 
patents to protect product lines from infringement lawsuits. An unsuccessful bid for a patent 
license could turn a firm into a litigation target. Participants must be assured that the exchange 
intermediary adequately protects sensitive data while making enough information accessible to 
attract potential buyers. These are difficult tradeoffs, since any exchange of patent rights relies on 
effective and comprehensive due diligence procedures and compliance monitoring mechanisms. 
SSIPEX unfortunately does not possess the resources necessary to monitor the compliance of its 
small Chinese members with relevant IP laws. A member could gain access to a valuable 
technology and then transfer it to others without proper authorization, thus inhibiting the 
development of SSIPEX as uncertainty about enforcement stops IP owners from making their 
technologies available (Chesbrough 2011). The lack of transparency in the Chinese IP system and 
insufficient evidence of past performance based on legal cases may deter IP owners from 
participating. Strengthening the institutional context in which these actors operate may go a long 
way in fostering security and certainty for IP owners willing to license their technologies.  
 
Technology Transfer and Commercialization Infrastructure 
 
Successful technology commercialization relies on coordinated action between research 
universities, technology transfer offices (TTOs), and industry. It requires a mix of human, 
financial, and institutional resources. Industry is usually the primary channel for 
commercialization and universities lack direct control over the amount of license revenue 
generated. The success of licensees, and thus the license income generated, depends on market 
factors such as timing, funding, and marketing (AUTM 2007). In the USA, while some licensing 
income naturally goes to developers and research units, federal law often dictates that a large 
proportion be channelled back to research at the campus level. Licensing income helps 
universities invest in infrastructure to support students and capital projects, and also directly 
funds both student and faculty researchers. ‘Absent this licensing income, a research institution’s 
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ability to create the impact, through the new innovation disclosures, new licenses, and new 
patent, copyright and trademark filings, would diminish’ (AUTM 2007). Most importantly, 
technology commercialization relies on a robust innovation ecosystem. Factors that help 
stimulate licensing revenue in the USA include the combined investment of university, federal 
and corporate R&D programs and grants, the prevalence of technology parks and incubators, 
venture capital and seed-expansion, as well as support services for start-ups in accounting, law, 
and marketing. The diversity of actors and support services results in thick markets for 
technology commercialization, enabling individuals to leverage the multiple institutional, 
financial and human resources in which they are embedded. Actors can rely on this ecosystem to 
seek help in negotiating flexible license terms, developing business models, recruiting talent, 
securing funds, and partnering with developers. The role of government support should not be 
underestimated. In 2010 alone, there was $39.1 billion in federally funded sponsored research 
expenditures in the USA (AUTM 2010). In contrast, the use of licensing in the developing world 
is frustrated by thin markets for technology. First and foremost, adequate IP enforcement is 
necessary in order for the IP system to act as an enabling environment for generating more 
licensing revenue. Companies must be assured that, if they pay for licenses, others will not 
simply steal technology, putting them at a competitive disadvantage. Yet, enforcement must be 
pursued in tandem with a more comprehensive approach to technology transfer, which recognizes 
the importance of technology parks, venture capital and monetization support services. 
 
The existence of professional associations that collect information relating to technology transfer 
and reflect on the process and impact of commercialization is tremendously valuable. The 
Association of University Technology Managers, initially founded in 1974 in order to address 
concerns that US federally-funded inventions were not commercialized effectively, is now a 
global network of technology transfer professionals from over 350 universities, research 
institutions, teaching hospitals, government agencies and companies. It has been at the forefront 
of funding, compiling, and publishing academic technology transfer data, particularly in North 
America. The AUTM STATT database is a statistical resource for policy makers to understand 
the extent and impact of licensing programs so far. In the USA in 2010, AUTM member 
organisations executed 4,284 licenses, resulting in a total of 38,528 active licenses and options 
(AUTM 2010). 651 start-ups were formed, and 3,657 continued to operate in total. 20,642 
inventions were disclosed, 12,281 new US patent applications were filed, and over $2.4 billion in 
total licensing income was generated (AUTM 2010). This type of impact assessment is vital in 
order to understand the role of TTOs and other organizations in patent monetization. AUTM has 
developed a universal licensing survey in order to support technology transfer globally through 
accurate impact measurement. The Association of European Science and Technology Transfer 
Professionals (ASTP) adopted this framework in 2009. Policymakers in developing countries 
should help domestic actors access these resources. Professional technology transfer associations 
are a valuable resource for TTOs in the developing world. International bodies such as AUTM, 
ASTP, the South African Research and Innovation Management Association (SARIMA) and the 
International Federation of Technology Transfer Organizations (IFTTO) should be leveraged to 
increase the efficacy of TTOs in the developing world. The Society for Technology Management 
(STEM), a non-profit organization recently created in Hyderabad, India to promote best practices 
in technology transfer and foster commercialization ecosystems is one of the initiatives that has 
been jointly funded by SARIMA, AUTM and IFTTO.  The global network of IFTTO members is 
a particularly useful starting point for policy makers in developing nations to familiarize 
themselves with the practice of technology transfer and patent monetization.  
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TTOs play an important role in supporting the monetization of IP while simultaneously fostering 
knowledge spillovers. They are particularly valuable in nations that have thinner technology 
markets. When nations lack adequate market-driven processes to spur licensing revenue, 
technology transfer offices should step in to foster stronger innovation ecosystems. Many 
developing countries have established TTOs to provide financial support, training, identify 
potential alliances, brokerage services, and legal advice during licensing and equipment 
purchases. It is common for these offices to provide FDI-related technology transfer incentives to 
multinational corporations in an effort to increase the flow of technology into their borders. FDI 
incentive programs often include mandatory provisions for the training of local actors and the 
establishment of long-term business partnerships (UNCTAD 2004). This is necessary because, 
although FDI is an important channel for the transfer of technology, it does not guarantee 
efficient transfer unless it guarantees a level of commitment to local capacity building. Dedicated 
financing services in technology transfer offices can also provide venture capital support to local 
actors. Studies suggest that the rate of successful technology transfer can vary greatly depending 
on the level of socio-economic development within a country (Jafarieh 2001). As experience with 
technology transfer grows, many offices are implementing a range of sophisticated mechanisms 
to ensure TTOs act as an enabler of IP commercialization in their home countries. The Industrial 
Technology Research Institute is a strong example of a successful technology transfer office. 
 
The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) was founded in Taiwan in 1973 and tasked 
with conducting and promoting research and development with the aim of increasing economic 
value in a number of important technology fields. Originally government-funded, the institute has 
been so successful that it is now entirely financially independent (Lee et al. 2009). It has been an 
integral component of facilitating the transfer of technology from developed economies and 
multinational corporations to Taiwanese SMEs and research institutes. The ITRI is a valuable 
example of the important role that research institutes and technology transfer offices can play in 
leveraging IP-based growth. In 1976 the ITRI signed the ‘CMOS IC Technology Transfer 
Licensing Agreement’ with RCA. Engineers were sent to the USA for training and returned with 
in-depth technical knowledge of semiconductor manufacturing
5
. By 1977, the first IC 
demonstration foundry was built and Taiwan was already on its way to becoming a major player 
in the semiconductor manufacturing industry. This government support for the semiconductor 
manufacturing industry enabled domestic actors to overcome significant barriers to entry posed 
by Japanese and South Korean firms.  
 
The strategic management of IP by ITRI has also fuelled the transference of patents from 
publically-funded research bodies to local firms who then commercialized the technology. ITRI 
staff were pivotal in early spin-off efforts in semiconductor manufacturing. UMC and TSMC, the 
largest semiconductor firms in Taiwan, were established as ‘spin-in’ companies. ‘Spin-in’ was 
the label used because these firms continued a close relationship with the ITRI, which had been 
so integral to the start up. Staff turnover with the private sector has been significant, with 
turnover rates reaching 15-20% in recent years (Lee et al. 2009). This staff turnover between the 
ITRI and firms that commercialize R&D in the private sector is an effective way of supporting 
the commercialization process since the transfer of know-how, skills and technical knowledge is 
an integral part of effective technology transfer (Arora 1995; Gertler 2003). Staff are even 
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encouraged to test the commercialization of their research through ‘virtual ventures’. The ITRI 
funds these activities in the short term in order to help staff develop their products and establish 
spin-off companies.  
 
Today, the ITRI and its affiliates conduct various R&D services and aid the process of 
technology transfer to industries in Taiwan. Its core responsibilities entail conducting advanced 
technological R&D, the provision of industrial services, as well as IP business and new venture 
support. It has helped small businesses gain access to over NT$ 245 million of government 
funding by helping them apply to the Small Business Innovation Research program.
6
 The ITRI 
has held over 163 training courses for over 8,000 participants in the last eight years and 
developed numerous multi-lateral technology cooperation agreements with major international 
firms. In 2009 alone, it conducted over 15,300 cases of R&D services and facilitated technology 
transfer to Taiwan’s private sector in over 1,100 cases; ITRI helps produce an incredible 5 
patents a day on average and in 2009 the institute applied for over 2,300 patents and registered 
over 1,300 (Lee et al. 2009). Most important, in terms of monetizing these patents through their 
commercial development, the ITRI classifies all patents according to three grades: A (high 
utilization potential), B (defensive patents), and C (low utilization value) (Lee et al. 2009). Such a 
classification demonstrates explicitly that the ITRI recognizes that patents have different uses and 
that their strategic value is inherently related to what they cover and the ways in which they are 
deployed.  
 
IP management and monetization is a key component of what ITRI does. Aiding the process of 
patent aggregation or patent pools among firms is one strategy ITRI uses to help monetize IP 
assets more efficiently in Taiwan (Shih 2005). The TFT-LCD (thin film transistor - liquid crystal 
display) alliance is a strong example of this monetization model. In 1990, ITRI aligned with the 
Taiwan TFT-LCD Association and seven of its subsidiaries to form a pooled patent portfolio of 
over 200 patents relating to flat-panel displays (Lee et al. 2009). The patent pool enabled local 
Taiwanese companies to enter the flat-panel display industry quite late, despite the significant 
barriers to entry posed by Japanese and South Korean competitors. By facilitating cross-licensing 
deals with these competitors using the patent pool created through the alliance, ITRI was integral 
to the development of this now lucrative industry in Taiwan (Shih 2005). The activities of the 
ITRI show the multiple strategies that can be implemented to facilitate domestic R&D and 
commercialization capacity. It has won countless innovation awards for its critical support. The 
ITRI is a valuable proto-type for technology transfer that could be widely replicated across 
emerging economies. 
 
Technology transfer offices have proliferated around the globe rapidly since the TRIPS 
Agreement. As developing countries continue to consolidate their IP regimes, technology transfer 
offices play an important role in attracting foreign companies with valuable IP into their borders 
and supporting domestic innovation processes by fostering extensive working relationships. Yet, 
simply attracting FDI and licensing IP assets is insufficient. A number of coordinated 
mechanisms can help to aid this process. Technology transfer offices should learn from the 
experiences of successful initiatives like the ITRI in pursuing their goal of helping local firms to 
access new technologies and monetize them. Policy makers must appreciate the value of TTOs 
and recognize the different roles that they can achieve. A TTO can limit its focus to helping 
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researchers negotiate flexible licensing terms and setting suitable research commercialization 
policies. It could extend this role to help form a licensee by supporting business plan 
development, securing funding and recruiting talent. It could even go a step further and 
participate directly in business operations and investment. The ITRI approach represents the 
latter, where research, development and monetization processes have been rolled into a single 
entity in order to promote technology transfer and licensing revenue in a specific industry. 
Establishing TTOs in developing nations and integrating them into the global network of 
technology transfer associations is a powerful instrument to support commercialization processes 
domestically by systematically sharing experiences, information and practices relating to 
licensing. It will increase awareness among start-ups and research institutions of the role and 
practice of licensing in promoting active markets for technology. 
 
Patent Litigation Support 
 
The rise of non-practicing entities (NPE) that accumulate large patent portfolios in order to 
monetize these assets through litigation procedures has been a controversial development in 
recent years. These pejoratively-labelled ‘patent trolls’ accumulate patent portfolios solely for the 
purposes of infringement lawsuits and license fees. They do not produce any product or 
innovation themselves. Their primary income thus derives from the enforcement of patent rights. 
Major international NPEs such as Intellectual Ventures are estimated to own between 10,000 - 
15,000 patents.
7
 Estimates of the loss in market capitalization resulting from NPE lawsuits in 
software alone over the past twenty years put the cost at $0.5 trillion.
8
 PatentFreedom, a company 
that charts the emergence of NPEs, has compiled a significant amount of data about litigation 
procedures originating from NPEs. 
 
Figure 6. Operating Company Counterparties in NPE Suits   
 
 
 
(Source: PatentFreedom, https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-lot.html) 
 
Figure 6 shows the rapid rise of NPE infringement litigation proceedings. In 1998, there were less 
than 250 companies that were engaged in litigation with an NPE. By 2010, that number has 
skyrocketed to 2,600, an increase of 48% over the average of the previous three years. NPEs can 
                                                 
7
 https://www.patentfreedom.com/research-phl.html 
8
 http://opensource.com/law/11/9/ginormous-losses-npe-software-patent-lawsuits 
24 
 
be a major burden to MNCs and SMEs alike. As patent infringement lawsuits create significant 
operating uncertainty in technology markets, the threat of lawsuits can stop innovating firms from 
commercializing potentially valuable technologies. While multinational firms with large patent 
portfolios and defensive patent pools have some strategies available to defend themselves against 
NPE litigation, SMEs, particularly in the developing world, are more at risk. Limited financial, 
legal and human resources means SMEs cannot respond to these threats as effectively and thus 
face significant barriers to entry in global technology markets. In a context where firm capacity to 
respond is weaker, there is a strong case for more active support from government departments or 
other public agencies (Lee et al. 2009). 
 
The Korean government has experimented with multiple types of support to aid Korean SMEs in 
their IPR disputes with international firms. Initially, this was in the form of direct cost-sharing 
initiatives between SMEs and the government regarding IPR disputes. The substantial cost of 
legal proceedings in IPR disputes would have meant that Korean SMEs seeking to commercialize 
a technology would encounter significant barriers to monetizing their IP. By distributing the cost, 
this initiative provided critical support to SMEs at the early stage of technology 
commercialization. The Korean government has helped fund the creation and sale of commercial 
IP insurance that covers the cost of potential infringement lawsuits. This enables start-ups to 
operate with reduced uncertainty and increased cash flows at the early stages of development. 
The Korean government pays 70% or more of the premium for IP insurance, thus reducing the 
burden for SMEs and stimulating domestic innovation in Korea. The government also supports 
SMEs in the process of market and export investigations to determine the probability of lawsuits 
when these companies wish to export their products to new markets.  
 
IPR disputes between Korean SMEs and foreign entities within the domestic market are also 
supported. Over 42 SMEs employed this service in 2009 (Lee et al. 2009). Help is provided in 
terms of analysis of legal patent documents, infringement claims, counterclaims and continuous 
support during legal processes. The government also supports SMEs in deciding on how to 
monetize their IP by providing consultancy on alternative licensing arrangements and patent 
pools. It has also fostered the development of a patent angel – a public-private consortium fund – 
that manages a set of IPRs for a group of SMEs. These SMEs pay membership fees or invest 
capital to become equity holders in the group, whose patent umbrella effectively defends SMEs 
in their proceedings with patent trolls and other infringement lawsuits (Lee et al. 2009). The 
Korean Presidential Council on National Competitiveness recently reviewed the fact that Korea’s 
Balance of Payments for trading technologies was at negative $2.9 billion, despite ranking fourth 
globally in terms of patent ownership. To promote funding for domestic innovation, the Council 
announced it would create a W20 billion fund to launch a management company for IP and will 
jointly invest with private actors up to W500 billion to start a Korean-based NPE.
9
 The budget for 
commercializing homegrown technologies will also be raised from 0.7% to 3% of total R&D 
spending.
10
 These initiatives serve as an important model for the developing world, which must 
support the commercialization of IP in order to progress from being mere patent owners to patent 
monetizers.  
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Conclusions 
 
The global diffusion of IPR regimes since the TRIPS agreement has been a controversial and 
costly process. Criticized as a strategic move by developed economies to secure competitive 
advantages in the global economy, the implementation process of IP systems has received 
significant attention. This debate initially focused on the impact of strong vs. weak IP regimes on 
economic growth and the ability of developing nations to take ownership of the IP system. While 
improving domestic ownership of IP in developing countries is a critical step towards a more 
equitable IP system, the monetization of IP is equally important. The value of IP is determined by 
the ways in which it is used, not the mere fact of its existence. The data surveyed suggests that 
the much-lamented IP ownership divide is starting to close for technologically sophisticated 
developing countries. This is particularly true in large emerging economies such as China, 
Russia, India and Brazil. The proportion of resident to non-resident patent applications is also 
improving in favour of resident applications, an important indicator of the development of 
domestic innovation capacity. The initiatives undertaken to foster domestic R&D and IP 
institutions should continue. The large emerging economies serve as an important example of the 
ability of the developing world to appropriate IP regimes to their own ends. Patent applications in 
low-income countries included in our sample remain disproportionately in favour of non-
residents. Policy makers in these nations may need to focus on increasing IP ownership before 
implementing policies targeting commercialization. Yet these realms are not mutually exclusive 
and it is important to develop capacity in both simultaneously in order to benefit from the global 
IP system. Significantly, the experience of China suggests that incentives to promote the use of IP 
should be balanced with a focus on the quality of resulting assets in order to generate greater 
licensing revenue. Emerging economies that have consolidated ownership over IP assets serve as 
a valuable model to low-income countries and it is important that policymakers understand the 
market dynamics and policies that have helped achieve this transformation.  
 
However, despite this closing gap in IP ownership in technologically sophisticated developing 
countries, a significant gap in IP commercialization remains. The same economies that are 
becoming global leaders in terms of the size of their patent portfolios suffer from a lack of 
corresponding increase in their financial returns from innovation. While traditional bilateral 
licensing remains an important mechanism to monetize IP, there are a number of other 
mechanisms available to generate value from IP. This paper has briefly outlined a few of these 
mechanisms, by reference to several case studies, and discussed the ways in which patent 
monetization can be improved in the developing world. Significantly, patent monetization can be 
stimulated using both market mechanisms and carefully structured government support. It is this 
combination of a positive institutional environment for patent commercialization and an 
awareness of the market mechanisms available to innovators that will promote stronger 
technology markets and generate more financial returns from IP in the developing world.  
 
Patent exchanges and patent securitization are two market-driven monetization processes that 
present valuable opportunities for actors in developing countries. Although exchanges and 
securitization deals occur primarily in developed economies, there is no reason that developing 
countries cannot leverage these mechanisms to access crucial funding opportunities to 
commercialize their technology. As firms in developing countries begin utilizing these platforms, 
they will gain direct access to investment and simultaneously bolster their IP monetization 
capacity. Experience with these mechanisms will be an important step in establishing functioning 
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markets for technology at home. The point is not to continue relying on institutions in the 
developed world, but to gradually develop capacity while still gaining direct access to important 
capital markets and monetization strategies. Public-private initiatives, such as the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute in Taiwan and the coordinated litigation support and defensive 
patent pools evident in South Korea, are also integral to closing the patent monetization divide. 
By promoting domestic technology markets, fostering knowledge spillovers, and implementing a 
range of tools to lower barriers to entry to international markets for actors in the developing 
world, these initiatives represent some of the ways to foster a more equitable global patent 
system. Policy makers should leverage existing networks of technology transfer professionals, 
such as AUTM or the IFTTO, to facilitate this process and share experiences, practices and 
information relating to technology transfer. 
 
IP owners in the developing world are not just passive recipients of proprietary innovation 
developed elsewhere. The evidence suggests that they are active participants in the global system 
who are beginning to increase their ownership of IP assets. As IP owners, they now face the 
challenge of how to exploit and monetize their assets. While recognizing that developing 
countries face distinct institutional challenges, it is equally true that they have ample 
opportunities to leverage the international IP system to promote economic growth at home. 
Alternative patent monetization methods - like exchanges, securitizations and defensive pools - 
are still a relatively new phenomenon. Though developing countries are at different stages of 
consolidating the ecosystem of institutional, legislative and market infrastructure that helps 
stimulate ownership and commercialization of IP, greater awareness of emerging patent 
monetization techniques will expand the range of options available to domestic actors. Naturally, 
a minimum level of IP enforcement, institutional development, and market sophistication is 
needed to fuel patent commercialization. Developing nations are certainly not homogeneous in 
this respect. Identifying the threshold for IP commercialization and understanding how to help 
countries attain it is an important avenue of research. However, policy makers in all developing 
countries can already begin to help innovators leverage the IP system to their advantage by 
implementing targeted public support programs and raising awareness about the market 
mechanisms at their disposal to monetize IP more effectively.  
References 
 
Anson, W. 2005. « Intangible Assets: A New Source of Security and Securitization ». The 
Secured Lender,(Jul/Aug 2005). 
Arora, A. 1995. « Licensing tacit knowledge: intellectual property rights and the market for 
know-how ». Economics of innovation and new technology 4 (1): 41–60. 
Arora, A., A. Fosfuri, and A. Gambardella. 2001. « Markets for technology and their implications 
for corporate strategy ». Industrial and Corporate Change 10 (2): 419. 
Bettig, R.V. 1996. Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Borod, R. S. 2005. « An update on intellectual property securitization ». The Journal of 
Structured Finance 10 (4): 65–72. 
Bozeman, B. 2000. « Technology transfer and public policy: a review of research and theory ». 
Research policy 29 (4-5): 627–656. 
27 
 
Calderini, Mario, and Maria Cristina Odasso. 2008. « Intellectual Property Portfolio 
Securitization: An Evidence Based Analysis ». SSRN eLibrary (août 1). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314805. 
Chesbrough, H. 2006. « Emerging secondary markets for Intellectual Property ». Research 
Report to National Center for Industrial Property Information and Traning (NCIPI). 
Dechezleprêtre, Antoine, Matthieu Glachant, Ivan Haščič, Nick Johnstone, and Yann Ménière. 
2011. « Invention and Transfer of Climate Change–Mitigation Technologies: A Global 
Analysis ». Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 5 (1): 109-130. 
Dorris, M. S. 2003. « The securitization of drug royalties: a new elixir ». First published in 
Global Securitisation and Structured Finance. 
Feldman, M. P, and R. Florida. 1994. « The geographic sources of innovation: technological 
infrastructure and product innovation in the United States ». Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 84 (2): 210–229. 
Gabala Jr, J. M. 2004. « Intellectual Alchemy”: Securitization of Intellectual Property As an 
Innovative Form of Alternative Financing ». John Marshall Review of Intellectual 
Property Law 3: 307–323. 
Gertler, M. S. 2003. « Tacit knowledge and the economic geography of context, or the 
undefinable tacitness of being (there) ». Journal of economic geography 3 (1): 75. 
Gould, David M., and William C. Gruben. 1996. « The role of intellectual property rights in 
economic growth ». Journal of Development Economics 48 (2) (mars): 323-350. 
doi:10.1016/0304-3878(95)00039-9. 
Hagelin, T. 2002. « New Method to Value Intellectual Property, A ». AIPLA Quarterly Journal 
30 (3): 353–403. 
Helfer, L.R. 2004. « Regime shifting: the TRIPS agreement and new dynamics of international 
intellectual property lawmaking ». Yale J. Int’l L. 29: 1. 
Henderson, Rebecca, Adam B. Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg. 1998. « Universities as a Source of 
Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting, 1965–1988 ». 
Review of Economics and Statistics 80 (1): 119-127. doi:10.1162/003465398557221. 
Hewitt-Dundas, Nola. 2011. « The role of proximity in university-business cooperation for 
innovation ». The Journal of Technology Transfer (juillet 24). doi:10.1007/s10961-011-
9229-4. http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s10961-011-9229-4. 
Hillery, J. S. 2004. « Securitization of intellectual property: recent trends from the United 
States ». Washington CORE consulting firm report, March. 
James R, Markusen. 2001. « Contracts, intellectual property rights, and multinational investment 
in developing countries ». Journal of International Economics 53 (1) (février): 189-204. 
doi:10.1016/S0022-1996(00)00058-1. 
Lanjouw, J.O., and J. Lerner. 1997. The enforcement of intellectual property rights: a survey of 
the empirical literature. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Lee, Keun, Kyooho Park, Jun-Byoung Oh, and Jinyoung Kim. 2009. Economics of IP in the 
Context of Shifting Innovation Paradigm. Dans WIPO Annual Report. 
Liu, Wei. 1995. « International technology transfer and development of technological 
capabilities: A theoretical framework ». Technology in Society 17 (1): 103-120. 
doi:10.1016/0160-791X(94)00028-C. 
Malackowski, J. E. 2006. « The Intellectual Property Marketplace: Past, Present and Future ». J. 
Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 5: 605–641. 
28 
 
Maskus, Keith E., and Jerome H. Reichman. 2004. « THE GLOBALIZATION OF PRIVATE 
KNOWLEDGE GOODS AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF GLOBAL PUBLIC 
GOODS ». Journal of International Economic Law 7 (2): 279-320. 
May, C. 2009. The global political economy of intellectual property rights: the new enclosures. 
May, Christopher. 2002. « Trouble in E-topia: Knowledge as Intellectual Property ». Urban 
Studies 39 (5-6): 1037-1049. 
McClure, I. D. « Commoditizing Intellectual Property Rights: The Practicability of a 
Commercialized and Transparent International IPR Market and the Need for International 
Standards ». Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal 6: 1. 
Merges, R. P. 1999. « Intellectual property rights, input markets, and the value of intangible 
assets ». Draft, February. 
Merges, R.P. 1994. « Of property rules, coase, and intellectual property ». Columbia 94: 26-55. 
Millien, R., and R. Laurie. 2007. « ASummary OF ESTABLISHED & EMERGING IP 
BUSINESS MODELS ». 
Mowery, D., and B. Sampat. 2005. « The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry 
technology transfer: a model for other OECD governments? » Essays in Honor of Edwin 
Mansfield: 233–245. 
Mowery, D.C., R.R. Nelson, B. Sampat, and A.A. Ziedonis. 1999. « The effects of the Bayh-Dole 
Act on US university research and technology transfer: An analysis of data from 
Columbia University, the University of California, and Stanford University ». Research 
Policy 29: 729–40. 
Mowery, David C., and Arvids A. Ziedonis. 2002. « Academic patent quality and quantity before 
and after the Bayh–Dole act in the United States ». Research Policy 31 (3) (mars): 399-
418. doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(01)00116-0. 
Noveck, B. S. 2006. « Peer to Patent: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent 
Reform ». Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 20 (1): 123–162. 
Reilly, R. F, and R. P Schweihs. 2004. The handbook of business valuation and intellectual 
property analysis. McGraw-Hill. 
Saggi, Kamal. 2002. « Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology Transfer: 
A Survey ». The World Bank Research Observer 17 (2): 191-235. 
Schrank, Andrew. 2004. « Ready-to-Wear Development? Foreign Investment, Technology 
Transfer, and Learning by Watching in the Apparel Trade ». Social Forces 83 (1): 123-
156. 
Scott, Shane. 2004. « Encouraging university entrepreneurship? The effect of the Bayh-Dole Act 
on university patenting in the United States ». Journal of Business Venturing 19 (1) 
(janvier): 127-151. doi:10.1016/S0883-9026(02)00114-3. 
Serrano, C. J. 2006. The market for intellectual property: Evidence from the transfer of patents. 
University of Minnesota. 
Teece, D. J. 1977. « Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of 
Transferring Technological Know-How ». The Economic Journal 87 (346) (juin 1): 242-
261. 
Trajtenberg, Manuel. 1990. « A penny for your quotes: patent citations and the value of 
innovations. » RAND Journal of Economics (RAND Journal of Economics) 21 (1): 172-
187. doi:Article. 
Ughetto, E., and C. Odasso. 2010. « PATENT VALUE: SELLER AND BIDDER 
PERSPECTIVES ». 
29 
 
Ziedonis, R. H. 2004. « Don’t fence me in: Fragmented markets for technology and the patent 
acquisition strategies of firms ». Management Science 50 (6): 804–820. 
Watanabe, H., 2004. Intellectual Property as Securitized Assets, The Institute of Intellectual  
Property, March 2004. 
 
Disclaimer: the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the World Bank, its affiliations or the University of Oxford. 
 
